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TESTIMONY: APPLYING THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE TO CAPITAL SENTENCING
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ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the death penalty cannot be
imposed arbitrarily, and that during sentencing in capital cases, jurors must be pro-
vided with guidelines to assist them in narrowing down the class of individuals for
whom the death penalty is appropriate. Typically, this is accomplished through the
presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence. One aggravating factor is a
capital offender’s future dangerousness, or the likelihood that the individual will en-
gage in violent institutional misconduct while in prison. Future dangerousness may
be assessed using a variety of measures; Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist-Revised
(PCL-R), a measure of personality traits associated with psychopathy, is one such
measure that informs future dangerousness testimony. However, research suggests
that the predictive validity of the PCL-R regarding violent institutional misconduct
is weak-to-moderate, and that presentation of such evidence can prejudice jurors such
that they will be more likely to assign the death penalty than they would in the ab-
sence of such evidence. These findings are concerning, particularly considering the
severe social costs and individual rights deprivations associated with the death penalty.
This Article will trace the history of Supreme Court capital sentencing decisions, ex-
amine the scientific literature regarding the predictive validity and bias potential for
PCL-R evidence in capital sentencing, and argue that, in light of this weak literature
base and the deleterious impact that misguided capital sentencing can have, applying
the Federal Rules of Evidence to capital sentencing contexts may present an effective
solution for keeping specious future dangerousness evidence out of the courtroom.
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INTRODUCTION
At first glance, Jack Kevorkian and James Grigson share some superficial similari-
ties.1 Both are males; both have one-syllable first names that begin with the letter J;
both grew up in the Great Depression/World War II era.2 Probing a little deeper,
both would go on to become medical doctors—Kevorkian a pathologist and Grigson
a psychiatrist.3 Further, both Kevorkian and Grigson led controversial careers that
sparked criticism from their governing bodies—Kevorkian from the American Medi-
cal Association and Grigson from the American Psychiatric Association.4 But dig
just a little deeper, and one will uncover a startling truth—both assisted in the deaths
of over 100 people and both aptly earned the nickname “Dr. Death.”5
Although Kevorkian was infamous for his actions and views regarding medically
assisted suicide and was certainly more widely known than Grigson, Grigson arguably
had a greater impact on his “victims.” Kevorkian, a pathologist who had developed a
lethal cocktail of drugs consisting of thiopental and potassium chloride, was responsible
1 Dr. Jack Kevorkian was a medical doctor renowned for his views regarding euthanasia
and his willingness to assist terminally ill patients in ending their lives. Keith Schneider, Dr.
Jack Kevorkian Dies at 83; A Doctor Who Helped End Lives, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/us/04kevorkian.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/J2RF-YYYN]. Dr. James Grigson was a Texas psychiatrist known for testifying on
behalf of the prosecution during the sentencing phases of capital murder cases, always testi-
fying that the defendant was a “sociopath” who represented a danger to society. They Call
Him Dr. Death, TIME, June 1, 1981, at 64, 64.
2 See sources cited supra note 1.
3 Schneider, supra note 1; Jade Walker, Jim Grigson, BLOG DEATH (June 16, 2004),
http://www.blogofdeath.com/2004/06/16/jim-grigson/ [https://perma.cc/XM9L-35WH].
4 Schneider, supra note 1; Mike Tolson, Effect of “Dr. Death” and His Testimony Lingers,
HOUS. CHRON. (June 17, 2004, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article
/Effect-of-Dr-Death-and-his-testimony-lingers-1960299.php [https://perma.cc/V8QL-RCCP].
5 Schneider, supra note 1; They Call Him Dr. Death, supra note 1, at 64; Tolson, supra
note 4.
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for the deaths of roughly 130 individuals, all of whom thought they were terminally
ill and had expressed a desire to die.6 In contrast, Grigson was responsible for testifying
in 167 capital murder trials, helping to garner death verdicts in a majority of them and
testifying in over 100 of those cases that the defendant, if released, was one hundred
percent certain to kill again.7 None of those defendants expressed a desire to die.
Kevorkian and Grigson also shared another unfortunate similarity—they were
not always correct in their judgments. According to a 2000 study in which medical
examiner and autopsy findings for euthanized Kevorkian patients were reviewed,
only about twenty-five percent of patients that Kevorkian euthanized were actually
terminally ill.8 Though a metric for Grigson’s errors is not as readily established,
there is one salient example of Grigson’s errors: Randall Dale Adams. Adams was
convicted of the murder of Dallas police officer Robert Wood in 1977.9 At trial, the
State produced testimony from its principal witness, David Harris, who claimed that
he had picked up Adams, who was hitchhiking on November 27, 1976.10 He asserted
that he and Adams had spent the day driving around, drinking beer, and smoking
marijuana, finally settling in to a drive-in movie come nighttime.11 Upon leaving the
movie, Harris claimed that he and Adams were stopped by a cop car, and that when
the officer approached, Adams reached under the front seat of the car, retrieved a
pistol, and shot the officer several times, killing him.12
At the sentencing phase of the trial, Grigson testified that, regarding Adams’s
future dangerousness, he “would place [him] at the very extreme, worse or severe
end of the scale,” and that “[t]here is nothing in the world today that is going to
change this man; we don’t have anything.”13 Under Texas law (both in 1977 and
now), to impose a sentence of death, one of the findings a jury must make is that
beyond a reasonable doubt there is a probability that the defendant, if allowed to
6 Schneider, supra note 1. Thiopental is a sedative; potassium chloride stops the heart. Id.
7 Texas ‘Dr. Death’ Retires After 167 Capital Case Trials, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2003),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/dec/20/20031220-113219-5189r/?page=all
[https://perma.cc/P65H-3JEW].
8 Lori A. Roscoe et al., Dr. Jack Kevorkian and Cases of Euthanasia in Oakland County,
Michigan, 1990–1998, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1735, 1736 (2000). Though only twenty-five
percent of Kevorkian patients were likely terminally ill, seventy-two percent had experienced
a recent health decline that likely triggered the desire to die. Id.
9 Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc), rev’d in part,
448 U.S. 38 (1980); Douglas Martin, Randall Adams, 61, Dies; Freed with Help of Film, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/us/26adams.html [https://perma
.cc/ET3A-CC2U].
10 Adams, 577 S.W.2d at 719.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 TEX. DEF. SERV., DEADLY SPECULATION: MISLEADING TEXAS CAPITAL JURIES WITH
FALSE PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 24 (2004) (citing Statement of Facts at 1410,
Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (No. 60,037)); see also Adams, 577
S.W.2d at 731.
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live, would commit future acts of violence that constitute a threat to society.14 Armed
with Grigson’s opinion testimony, the jury voted to impose the death penalty on
Adams.15 The problem? Adams was innocent.16
Adams’s journey to exoneration is chronicled in director Errol Morris’s 1988
documentary, The Thin Blue Line.17 Morris originally intended to document Grigson,
the man he knew as “Dr. Death,” but in interviewing Adams, who proclaimed his
innocence, Morris’s curiosity was piqued.18 Upon looking into Adams’s case, Morris
found that the District Attorney’s Office had “withheld exculpatory evidence from
the defense” and “manipulated key witnesses.”19 Shortly after the film’s release,
David Harris, the prosecution’s chief witness, recanted his trial testimony in court,
admitting that he had indeed been the one who killed Officer Wood.20 Twelve years
after his conviction, Randall Dale Adams was freed; despite Grigson’s expert opinion
and testimony, Adams was considered a consummate inmate with a record devoid
of violent behavior or disciplinary infractions.21
How could such a heinous misapplication of justice occur? How could “Dr. Death”
have been so off-base in his prediction? One likely culprit was Grigson’s evaluation
practices—he would often reach his “100% certain[ ]” opinions on future dangerous-
ness without examining the defendant in person,22 and, in Adams’s case, he met with
Adams for only fifteen minutes, pacing him through a series of mindless tasks and ask-
ing a few questions about Adams’s family and background before reaching his opinion
that Adams was a dangerous sociopath.23 But another likely and more significant
culprit is the fact that psychologists and psychiatrists are simply poor at predicting
future dangerousness, at least in capital contexts. This Article will seek to shed some
light on this issue. Part I will trace some of the relevant Supreme Court decisions re-
garding capital sentencing procedure and examine Supreme Court doctrine regarding
capital sentencing decisions. Part II will consider problems with future dangerousness
testimony, both from empirical and penological perspectives. Finally, Part III will
suggest a solution for limiting the impact of specious future dangerousness testimony
14 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2 (a)(2)(b)–(c) (West 2013); Michael L.
Radelet, Randall Dale Adams: Filmmaker Helped Free Innocent Man, NW. PRITZKER SCH. L.:
BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (June 26, 2011), http://www.law
.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/tx/randall-dale-adams.html
[https://perma.cc/3RC5-3LAK].
15 Radelet, supra note 14.
16 Id.
17 THE THIN BLUE LINE (Miramax Films 1988).
18 The First Innocent Man, BAD LAW. (June 27, 2011), http://badlawyernyc.blogspot.com
/2011/06/first-innocent-man.html [https://perma.cc/PJ9K-6A3E].
19 Id.
20 Radelet, supra note 14.
21 TEX. DEF. SERV., supra note 13, at 25.
22 Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
23 Bennett L. Gershman, The Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in the Fact-Finding Process?,
9 PACE L. REV. 275, 296, 310 (1989).
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in capital contexts in the form of applying the Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically
Rules 401, 402, 403, 702, and 703, to capital sentencing proceedings involving the
presentation of future dangerousness evidence. A commonly used measure offered
to demonstrate risk of future dangerousness, Hare’s PCL-R, is offered as an example
of how these rules might be applied.
I. DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT
Capital sentencing is the process by which homicide offenders are sentenced to
death. Contemporarily, capital sentencing arises as the second phase of a bifurcated
death penalty trial, with the first phase focused on determining a defendant’s cul-
pability and the second phase focused on deciding an appropriate punishment.24
Because death represents a severe and permanent liberty deprivation, the Supreme
Court has placed many constitutional restrictions on the administration of the death
penalty. Some of those restrictions regard the class of individuals eligible to receive
the death penalty. As of 2016, the Court has ruled that the following classes of
individuals are ineligible for the death penalty: (1) individuals who are incompetent
to be executed;25 (2) the intellectually disabled;26 (3) juveniles;27 and (4) offenders
24 Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, What One Hand Giveth, the Other Taketh Away: How Future
Dangerousness Corrupts Guilt Verdicts and Produces Premature Punishment Decisions in
Capital Cases, 32 PACE L. REV. 447, 447 (2012).
25 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986). Ford was convicted of murder in
Florida in 1974 and sentenced to death; while awaiting death, his mental health deteriorated,
with Ford experiencing symptoms resembling Schizophrenia, Paranoid Subtype, with a po-
tential for suicide. Id. at 401–03. The Court held that executing incompetent individuals was
barbaric and did not serve any legitimate penological interests and thus constituted a violation
of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 401, 409–10; see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,
954–61 (2007) (holding that capital offenders cannot be executed if they do not understand
the reason why they are being executed).
26 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). In 1996, Daryl Atkins and William Jones
kidnapped, robbed, and killed a military airman; Atkins, who had an IQ of 59, was convicted of
the murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 307–09, 338. The Court held that a national consensus
had emerged against executing the intellectually disabled, and that executing these individuals
served no legitimate penological interests and therefore constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 316, 321. The Court left it to the individual states to
define mental retardation. Id. at 317. However, the Court subsequently held in Hall v. Florida
that basing a determination of intellectual disability solely on IQ scores without allowing for the
presentation of other evidence indicating deficits in adaptive functioning for individuals scoring
between 70–75 was unconstitutional, as a score of 70 fell within the standard error of measure-
ment. 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996, 1998–2001 (2014). Note that the Supreme Court recently heard oral
argument in the case of Moore v. Texas, a case examining whether it is unconstitutional to rely
on outdated medical standards in determining intellectual disability for Atkins purposes. See
generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (argued Nov. 29, 2016). A
decision is expected in coming months. For the opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
indicating it not necessary to use current medical standards see Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Moore v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2407 (2016).
27 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Roper involved the case of Christopher
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who have committed crimes other than homicide.28 Other restrictions are procedural
and will be covered in detail below.
The Court’s first marquee opinion regarding capital sentencing procedure was
Furman v. Georgia.29 Furman was an amalgamation of three cases, one involving
murder in Georgia, and two involving rape, one each in Georgia and Texas.30 The
Court reached a 5–4 per curiam opinion, indicating that “the imposition and carrying
out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”31 The Court declined to provide
specific reasoning for the holding; however, Justices Stewart, White, and Douglas
all indicated that they felt the imposition of the death penalty in these cases was
arbitrary, and Justice Stewart went as far as to say:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the
people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many
just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capri-
ciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death has in fact been imposed. My concurring Brothers have
demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection
Simmons, who with an accomplice burglarized the victim’s home and threw her off a bridge,
killing her. Id. at 556–57. Simmons was convicted and sentenced to death. Id. at 556. Simmons
was seventeen at the time the murder was committed. Id. The Court held that executing minors
ran counter to “evolving standards of decency” and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 561, 578 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
28 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446–47, modified, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008). Patrick
Kennedy was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape of his stepdaughter, then eight
years old. Id. at 412–13. At the time, Louisiana law allowed for the imposition of the death
penalty for the rape of a child under twelve years of age. Id. at 413. The Court found that
there is a national consensus against imposing the death penalty for child rape, and held that
death was a disproportionate punishment for crimes that did not involve death. Id. at 426,
434, 446–47. In earlier cases decided under the proportionality principle, the Court held that
death was not a proportionate punishment for the rape of an adult, Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 598, 600 (1977) (plurality opinion), or for felony murder when the defendant did not
intend to, attempt to, or actually kill the victim, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982),
abrogated by Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). However, following Enmund, the Court
held that an offender could be executed for felony murder if he or she was a key player in the
underlying felony and displayed reckless indifference toward human life. Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). Also note that the Supreme Court has yet to render an opinion re-
garding whether individuals may still be sentenced to death for crimes against the State, such
as treason, espionage, or being the “kingpin” in a drug trafficking operation, though the
offenses may not involve death. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 794, 2381, 3591(b) (2012).
29 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
30 Id. at 239.
31 Id. at 239–40.
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of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally im-
permissible basis of race.32
This opinion led to over 600 death row inmates having their sentences commuted;33
additionally, thirty-five states reconsidered their death penalty statutes and passed
new legislation.34
The Court subsequently considered procedural issues in capital sentencing in
Gregg v. Georgia.35 In Gregg, defendant Tony Gregg and an accomplice were picked
up by two men while hitchhiking before proceeding to rob and murder them.36 Georgia
law provided for bifurcated proceedings; in the sentencing phase, either the judge or
the jury was to hear any additional evidence of extenuating, mitigating, or aggravating
circumstances and factors in preparation for rendering their decisions, as well as pun-
ishment arguments by both sides.37 Additionally, the State was limited to presenting
only aggravating factors that had been made known to the defendant ahead of trial.38
The statute also indicated that a sentence of death could only be imposed when one
of ten aggravating circumstances delineated in the law was found beyond a reasonable
doubt, and procedures existed for expedited direct review by the Supreme Court of
Georgia regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence.39 The Court held that such
a sentencing procedure was constitutional, as the Georgia scheme addressed the issue
of arbitrariness by outlining objective criteria that needed to be met to impose the death
penalty and providing for the consideration of the “particularized nature of the crime
and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant.”40 These guidelines
effectively channeled the jury’s discretion, preventing a jury from “wantonly and
32 Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
33 James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, Institutional and Postrelease Behavior of
Furman-Commuted Inmates in Texas, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 677, 677 (1988).
34 John Anthony Dukes, Sr., The Effect of Furman v. Georgia on State Death Penalty Legis-
lation 52 (2008) (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of South Carolina), http://gradworks
.umi.com/33/39/3339058.html [https://perma.cc/V3VV-3V64]. Furman is also recognized
as the precipitant for states’ adoptions of bifurcated capital trials; before Furman, most states
carried out single proceedings in which guilt and punishment were determined concurrently.
Vartkessian, supra note 24, at 447.
35 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
36 Id. at 158–59.
37 Id. at 163–64.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 164–66.
40 Id. at 206–07. In two other cases decided with Gregg, Woodson v. North Carolina and
Roberts v. Louisiana, the Court held that North Carolina’s and Louisiana’s death penalty stat-
utes were unconstitutional because they established a range of crimes for which the death pen-
alty was to be mandatorily imposed, thus taking away the element of discretion in sentencing.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329–31, 335–36 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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freakishly impos[ing] the death sentence[.]”41 Armed with guidelines with which to
tailor their statutes, state executions increased drastically post-Gregg.42
The Court next tackled several cases involving issues regarding what information
was allowed to be considered at sentencing. In Lockett v. Ohio,43 defendant Lockett was
charged with aggravated murder;44 at the time, Ohio law required judges to mandatorily
impose the death penalty unless one or more of the following mitigating circum-
stances were met by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the victim had prompted
the offense, (2) the defendant would not have committed the offense if not coerced,
provoked, or under duress, or (3) the offense was the result of psychosis or mental
deficiency on the part of the defendant.45 The Court held that it was unconstitutional
to limit the range of mitigating factors in such a way, and that the sentencer must not
be precluded from considering any and all mitigating factors that may be relevant.46
The Court followed this up in Beck v. Alabama,47 a case in which defendant Beck
had been convicted of robbery with an intentional killing and sentenced to death;
Beck’s partner had intentionally killed the victim while the duo was committing a rob-
bery.48 Under Alabama law, the felony murder doctrine was insufficient to prove intent
to kill, meaning that intent, a key element of the crime of which Beck was convicted,
could not be established.49 However, under Alabama’s death penalty statute, felony
murder was a lesser included offense of the crime of robbery with an intentional killing,
and judges were specifically prohibited from instructing a jury of this lesser included
offense; this effectively limited a jury’s options to either convicting a defendant of
the capital offense or acquitting him.50 The Court held the prohibition to be uncon-
stitutional under a theory that to bar consideration of the lesser included offense
risked an unwarranted conviction, which would not be in accordance with precedent
establishing that a death sentence not be applied based on “caprice or emotion.”51
Next was Ring v. Arizona.52 In Ring, Ring and some accomplices robbed an ar-
mored car in Arizona in 1994; Ring was convicted of first-degree murder in accordance
41 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206–07.
42 H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and
the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453, 457 (2003).
43 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
44 Id. at 589.
45 Id. at 593–94.
46 Id. at 608. Tennard v. Dretke expanded upon Ring v. Arizona, providing that it is uncon-
stitutional to restrict presentation of mitigating evidence to a jury in capital cases. Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that
“[c]apital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature
conditions an increase in their maximum punishment”).
47 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
48 Id. at 627, 630.
49 Id. at 627–28.
50 Id. at 628–29.
51 Id. at 637–38 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
52 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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with the felony murder rule and sentenced to death.53 At the time, Arizona law dictated
that sentencing hearings be held in front of a judge alone, who was to determine the
presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then render a sentencing
decision.54 Extending the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey55 to capital sentencing
contexts, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment precluded judges from finding the
aggravating circumstances necessary to sentence a defendant to death, reserving that
right expressly for a jury.56
The most recent significant development in the Court’s capital sentencing pro-
cedure jurisprudence came in Hurst v. Florida.57 Hurst involved the case of Timothy
Lee Hurst, convicted of first-degree murder in the state of Florida for murdering a
co-worker.58 At the time of his conviction, Florida employed a sentencing scheme
in which a jury determined a capital offender’s guilt and could make a sentencing
recommendation, but a judge was tasked with determining the existence of aggravat-
ing circumstances and imposing the ultimate penalty.59 The Court held such a sen-
tencing procedure to be unconstitutional, stating that, “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires
a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s
mere recommendation is not enough.”60
Viewed collectively, these cases indicate the Court’s intention to place death judg-
ments solely in the hands of a jury of the defendant’s peers. These opinions also indi-
cate the Court’s desire to provide at least some minimal level of protection for capital
offenders who do not fit any of the exclusion criteria previously outlined61 by requiring
states to provide guidelines for the imposition of the death penalty to help juries avoid
making arbitrary death sentence decisions. To do this, states have “bifurcated capital
jury trials” to create separate trial and sentencing phases, generated non-exhaustive
lists of statutory mitigating circumstances, and adopted statutory aggravating factors
53 Id. at 589–92, 595.
54 Id. at 592–93.
55 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment proscribed
judges from modifying a criminal sentence based on aggravating factors found by the judges
themselves as opposed to the jury. Id. at 476.
56 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. Following Ring, several cases touched on procedural issues,
though less integral issues than in the cases outlined above. The Court’s holding in Oregon
v. Guzek allowed states to limit the presentation of exculpatory evidence to trial, meaning
that states could prevent a defendant’s presentation of new exculpatory evidence during the
sentencing phase. 546 U.S. 517, 519 (2006). Additionally, in Kansas v. Marsh, the Court held
that a defendant could be sentenced to death even when aggravating and mitigating factors
offset each other. 548 U.S. 163, 165–66 (2006).
57 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
58 Id. at 619–20.
59 Id. at 620.
60 Id. at 619.
61 See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
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that need to be found for a jury to impose a sentence of death.62 One aggravating
factor outlined by some states is a defendant’s future dangerousness.63
II. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
In capital sentencing contexts, future dangerousness is the probability that an
individual, absent a penalty of death, will engage in future violent behavior either
in prison or upon release from custody, and hence constitute a danger to others.64
Future dangerousness evidence is typically offered via expert testimony from psy-
chologists and psychiatrists.65
A. Legal Foundation
The legal foundation of future dangerousness testimony was set by the 1983 Su-
preme Court case Barefoot v. Estelle.66 In Barefoot, Thomas Barefoot was convicted
of the murder of a police officer in Texas.67 Under Texas law, a defendant could be
sentenced to death if the jury found that the homicide was committed intentionally and
deliberately and that there was a probability that the defendant would commit future
acts of criminal violence that would render him a perpetual threat to the community.68
The State offered two psychiatrists, one the aforementioned “Dr. Death,” James
Grigson, who testified that Barefoot “would probably commit further acts of violence
62 Alexander Bunin, When Trial and Punishment Intersect: New Defects in the Death
Penalty, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 233, 244–45 (2004).
63 See Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert
Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L.
267, 267 n.1 (2001). Currently, six states consider future dangerousness in their capital sen-
tencing statutes, with two requiring a finding of probability of future dangerousness for the
death penalty to be imposed. Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness
in Capital Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-
Making, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 64 n.5 (2005). These states are Idaho, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. (citing IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(9)(h) (2004); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1)(b)(B) (2003); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1) (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2(1)
(2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (2003)). Aside from proving a statutory aggravating
circumstance, evidence of future dangerousness might be used as evidence of a non-statutory ag-
gravating factor that the jury can consider in their decision-making, or in rebuttal to a defendant’s
assertion that he/she is not a future danger. Dorland & Krauss, supra, at 64–65 & nn.12–13.
64 Matt DeLisi & Ed A. Munoz, Future Dangerousness Revisited, 14 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y
REV. 287, 287–88 (2003).
65 Krauss & Sales, supra note 63, at 267.
66 463 U.S. 880 (1983), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217, as
recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
67 Id. at 883.
68 Id. at 883–84 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1981)).
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and represent a continuing threat to society.”69 Fueled by this testimony, the jury
sentenced Barefoot to die.70
On appeal, Barefoot offered three arguments. First, he argued that his punish-
ment was unconstitutional because it was based on the testimony of psychiatrists,
who “individually and as a class, are not competent to predict future dangerousness.
Hence, their predictions are so likely to produce erroneous sentences that their use
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”71 Second, he contended “psychi-
atrists should not be permitted to testify about future dangerousness in response to
hypothetical questions and without having examined the defendant personally.”72
Third, Barefoot suggested that, under “the particular circumstances of this case, the
testimony of [Grigson and the other psychiatrist] was so unreliable that [his] sen-
tence should be set aside.”73
Regarding the first argument, the Court likened banning psychiatrists from
testifying on future dangerousness to “disinvent[ing] the wheel,” paid deference to
its decisions in Jurek v. Texas74 and Estelle v. Smith,75 indicated that it was the job
of the jury to decide how much weight to accord to future dangerousness testimony,
and suggested that jurors were capable of realizing the shortcomings of future
dangerousness testimony.76 Addressing the second argument, the Court indicated
that evidence is commonly admitted for the purposes of helping the “factfinder do
its assigned job” and noted that hypothetical questions are common in examinations
of expert witnesses.77 Considering the third contention, the Court deferred to the
opinions of the Texas courts, which found that, though the hypothetical questions
reflected details of the case at bar, there was “[no] constitutional infirmity in the
application of the Texas Rules of Evidence in this particular case.”78
69 Id. at 884.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 884–85, 896. The American Psychiatric Association agreed with Barefoot, sub-
mitting an amicus brief which asserted that future violence testimony should not be admissible
because psychiatric knowledge was not yet advanced enough to make accurate long-term
dangerousness predictions. Lisa M. Dennis, Constitutionality, Accuracy, Admissibility: Assess-
ing Expert Predictions of Future Violence in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 10 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 292, 298 (2002) (citing Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychiatric Association at
8–9, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080)).
72 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
73 Id.
74 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
75 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
76 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896–98. Jurek v. Texas declared that it was permissible to consider
the likelihood of a defendant’s committing future crimes as a death penalty criterion. 428 U.S.
at 269, 276. Estelle v. Smith indicated that there was “no sense disapproving the use of psy-
chiatric testimony bearing on the issue of future dangerousness[.]” 451 U.S. at 473.
77 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 903.
78 Id. at 904–05.
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Practically, Barefoot represented a major loss for capital defendants.79 However,
capital defendants would be granted a reprieve following the Court’s decision in the
1994 case Simmons v. South Carolina.80 Simmons was convicted of the murder of
an elderly woman in 1990; due to his guilty plea to charges of burglary and sexual
assault the week before his trial and a South Carolina statute declaring individuals
convicted of violent offenses subsequent to their original violent offense ineligible
for parole, Simmons would spend the rest of his life in prison with no possibility of pa-
role if not sentenced to death.81 At sentencing, the prosecution argued that Simmons’s
future dangerousness was an aggravating factor for the jury to consider in imposing
death.82 Simmons, armed with studies to back him up, suggested that the jury might
not understand that life imprisonment, at least in his case, did not allow opportunity
for parole, and asked for the judge to instruct the jury accordingly.83 Essentially, this
would limit the context in which future dangerousness could be considered to vio-
lence conducted in prison as opposed to in both prison and the community.84
The prosecution opposed such an instruction, the trial court declined to provide
one, and Simmons was sentenced to death.85 The Supreme Court held that it violated
Simmons’s due process rights for the trial court not to issue such an instruction.86
The practical impact of this decision was an undercutting of the prosecution’s argu-
ments regarding future dangerousness in cases involving death versus life without
parole, as the only relevant inquiry was the defendant’s likelihood of violence in an
institutional setting.87 Realistically, Simmons represented only a small victory for
defendants in capital cases—future dangerousness testimony still led to an increas-
ing number of executions and inconsistent standards for the admission of evidence
to mitigate future dangerousness.88
B. Problems with Future Dangerousness Testimony
Though he lost his case, Barefoot was right to be concerned about the ability of
psychologists and psychiatrists to predict future dangerousness—the empirical evi-
dence base suggesting that clinicians can accurately predict future dangerousness in
capital cases is quite thin. However, in addition to and in conjunction with empirical
concerns, future dangerousness testimony may present penological concerns in that
the accepted rationales for punishment, utilitarianism and retributivism, might be
undermined. Each of these issues will be expanded upon in turn.
79 Dennis, supra note 71, at 298–99.
80 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
81 Id. at 156–57.
82 Id. at 157.
83 Id. at 158–59.
84 Id. at 163–64.
85 Id. at 159–60.
86 Id. at 171.
87 Dennis, supra note 71, at 300.
88 Id.
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1. Poor Empirical Evidence
Research suggests two things regarding institutional violence: (1) capital of-
fenders sentenced to death do not engage in institutional misconduct at rates higher
than capital offenders sentenced to life in prison, and (2) the field of psychology is
poor at predicting future dangerousness in institutional settings. Regarding the former,
the research suggests both: (1) that the base rate of institutional violence in death
row offenders is low, and (2) death row offenders may actually be less violent than
non-capital offenders or the general prison population.89 In assessing violence risk
of any kind, base rates are an integral data point to consider—in fact, when consider-
ing an individual’s risk of violence, “the most accurate probability is the base rate
of violence in the corresponding group to which the individual belongs.”90 Adjusting
a violence risk estimate from a group’s base rate introduces error in violence risk pre-
diction, rendering the prediction less valuable and likely less accurate.91 In capital con-
texts, multiple studies suggest that rates of serious institutional violence among capital
offenders is quite low; therefore, the likelihood that any particular capital offender
will pose a serious risk of institutional violence should be correspondingly low.
For example, for fifteen years, James Marquart and Jonathan Sorensen followed
558 former death row offenders who had their sentences commuted by Furman.92
The researchers found that only approximately 30% of the sample committed
institutional infractions generally during that period, and that only six murders and
fifty-nine serious acts of violence were reported.93 Further, of these sixty-five serious
violent infractions, more than half were committed by a small pocket of the sample
(7.4%).94 Summed up by the researchers, “[i]n short, most of the Furman inmates
were not violent menaces to the institutional order. As a group, they were not a
disproportionate threat to guards and other inmates.”95 Another study in 1994 by
89 See John F. Edens et al., Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Murder
Trials: Is It Time to “Disinvent the Wheel?”, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 58–59 (2005) (dis-
cussing a study that compared “former death row inmates who had their sentences commuted
or reversed” with a group of “capital murderers sentenced to life imprisonment,” both of which
were compared to a general prison population and inmates of “a single high-security prison”).
90 MARK D. CUNNINGHAM, EVALUATION FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING 68–69 (2010). A base
rate is “a statistic used to describe the percentage of a population that demonstrates some
characteristic” and is defined as the “frequency or likelihood of an event occurring without
intervention.” Teresa L. Davenport, Base Rate, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILD BEHAVIOR AND
DEVELOPMENT 209, 209 (Sam Goldstein & Jack A. Naglieri eds., 2011).
91 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 90, at 69.
92 See generally James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the
Furman-Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 5 (1989).
93 Id. at 20–21.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 20.
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Marquart and colleagues produced similar results.96 Following a total of 421 Texas
death row inmates for the fifteen-year period between 1974–1988, the researchers
found that only sixty-three violent acts were committed; again, a small pocket of
offenders (10%) accounted for the majority of these acts.97 A 2009 study of eighty
capital offenders in Arizona who had received a transfer from death row supports
these previous findings; only 3.8% of former capital offenders committed an assault
resulting in great bodily harm and only 1.3% engaged in an assault leading to death.98
Considering the base rate of institutional violence in death row offenders com-
pared to life offenders or the general prison population, research also suggests that
the base rate of institutional violence may be lower for the former group than for the
latter two groups.99 For example, a 1989 study by Marquart, Ekland-Olson, and
Sorensen compared a sample of 107 life offenders to a sample of ninety-two former
death row inmates to the general Texas prison population.100 Results from the study
indicated that the former death row inmates committed acts of institutional violence
at one-tenth the rate of life offenders.101 Perhaps more shockingly, the former death
row offenders committed acts of institutional violence at one-fifth the rate of the
general prison population.102
Regarding the field of psychology’s ability to predict future dangerousness in
institutional settings, base rates of inmate assaults are low to begin with; as a result, the
studies that seek to identify predictive factors of inmate violence necessarily need
to “expand[ ] the definitions of inmate ‘aggression’ to include misconduct ranging
from verbal belligerence, to threats, to self-injury, [and] to property damage[.]”103
Such conduct may be considered deviant, but it is not generally considered to be
violent in such a way as to pose perpetual danger for “actual interpersonal harm.”104
96 See JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923–1990, at 179 (1994).
97 Id.
98 See Jon R. Sorensen & Mark D. Cunningham, Once a Killer, Always a Killer? Prison
Misconduct of Former Death-Sentenced Inmates in Arizona, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 237,
253–54 (2009). For a summary of other studies indicating that the base rate of serious insti-
tutional violence among capital offenders is low, see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 90, at 72–75.
99 See generally James W. Marquart et al., Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors
Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 449 (1989)
(conducting a study comparing ninety-two former death row inmates to those originally sen-
tenced to life imprisonment).
100 Edens et al., supra note 89, at 58, 59 (citing Marquart et al., supra note 99).
101 Id. at 59.
102 Id. For a summary of other studies indicating that the rate of serious institutional vio-
lence of capital offenders sentenced to death is equivalent to or lower than rates for life
offenders or offenders in general, see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 90, at 73–74.
103 Mark D. Cunningham et al., Assertions of “Future Dangerousness” at Federal Capital
Sentencing: Rates and Correlates of Subsequent Prison Misconduct and Violence, 32 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 46, 49 (2008).
104 Id.
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Additionally, even using this expanded definition of “aggression,” studies still fail
to show that psychological measures that assess personality characteristics, disor-
ders, and violence risk in the community are reliable in helping to predict prison
misconduct in capital offenders.105
2. Penological Concerns: Principles of Punishment
In addition to a research base that suggests that future dangerousness testimony
is not helpful in predicting institutional misconduct, future dangerousness testimony
may run counter to accepted principles of punishment. In the United States, punish-
ment is justified under rationales of utilitarianism and retributivism.106 The central
premise to utilitarianism is that punishment should serve the public good by deter-
ring, isolating, and rehabilitating offenders.107 Retributivism’s foundation is moral-
ity, and it dictates that offenders should be punished commensurately for the harm
they have caused.108 Given the poor research base for the predictive ability of
psychologists and psychiatrists to predict institutional violence, it would seem that
future dangerousness testimony at capital sentencing would not map onto either of
these two principles of punishment.
Regarding utilitarianism, imposition of the death penalty based on future dan-
gerousness testimony does not fit with the goals of deterrence, isolation, or rehabili-
tation. Considering deterrence, given that the rates of institutional violence among
capital offenders sentenced to death may actually be lower than the rates for capital
offenders sentenced to life in prison or the general prison population,109 it may be
the case that there is less to deter for death row inmates. Concerning isolation, the
capital offenders in jurisdictions where life means life are equally isolated from
society at large regardless of whether they are on death row or in the general prison
population; additionally, given the evidence suggesting that offenders on death row
pose no violence risk above that of the general prison population, an additional level
of isolation is unnecessary.110 Regarding rehabilitation, in jurisdictions where life
means life, capital offenders will not be paroled into the community, and given the
105 Id. Common measures of personality include the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) and the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI). See id. Common mea-
sures of violence risk in the community include the PCL-R; the Violence Risk Assessment
Guide (VRAG); the Historical, Clinical, Risk Management-20 (HCR-20); and the Level of
Service/Case Management Inventory (LSI). See id.
106 Albin Eser, The Nature and Rationale of Punishment, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2427,
2428–29 (2007).
107 Id. at 2429.
108 Id.
109 See supra Section II.B.1.
110 This proposition seems especially so given the research suggesting that solitary con-
finement while on death row can cause numerous deleterious physical and mental health
consequences. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A DEATH BEFORE DYING: SOLITARY CON-
FINEMENT ON DEATH ROW 6–7 (2013).
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low rates of institutional violence among death row offenders, there is no threat
presented above and beyond the concerns posed by general offenders to rehabilitate.
Considering retributivism, a core tenet of retributivism is fairness—individuals
are supposed to receive punishment commensurate to their crimes.111 Although it is
arguable that other aggravating circumstances may call for a greater punishment to
be commensurate with the offense committed, it seems fundamentally unfair to sen-
tence an offender to a greater punishment based on a future dangerousness determi-
nation that has little empirical backing. Additionally, given the research suggesting
that death row offenders may engage in institutional violence at a lower rate than
general population offenders,112 it would also seem unfair to sentence them to a
greater punishment based on a propensity that does not exist.
III. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: APPLYING THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE TO CAPITAL SENTENCING WHEN QUESTIONS OF
FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS ARE AT ISSUE
Given concerns about the reliability of future dangerousness predictions and the
difficulty reconciling a sentence of death imposed due to a determination of future
dangerousness when the scientific evidence does not support it, some solution is
needed. The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) do not apply during sentencing,113 and
a majority of the states have adopted the FRE and their inapplicability at sentencing.114
Because of this, one potential solution to the problems associated with future danger-
ousness testimony may be to apply FRE 401, 402, 403, 702, and 703 to capital
sentencing. FRE 401 and 402 provide for the inclusion of relevant evidence and the
exclusion of irrelevant evidence.115 FRE 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant
evidence that is substantially more prejudicial, misleading, confusing, dilatory,
procrastinatory, or needlessly cumulative than probative.116 FRE 702 provides that
experts may offer opinion or other testimony provided that their testimony is “based
111 Eser, supra note 106, at 2434.
112 See supra Section II.B.1.
113 FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); Bunin, supra note 62, at 236.
114 Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros and Cons,
43 OKLA. L. REV. 293, 293 (1990). However, some states, such as Louisiana, have expressly
applied evidentiary rules to capital sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.2 (2012).
115 FED. R. EVID. 401–402. The full text of Rule 401 is: “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401. FRE 402 generally
holds that all relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not admissible. FED.
R. EVID. 402.
116 FED. R. EVID. 403. The full text for the rule is: “The court may exclude relevant evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or need-
lessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Id.
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on sufficient facts or data,” and “the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods.”117 Finally, FRE 703 allows for experts to testify based on otherwise
inadmissible evidence, as long as experts in that field would normally rely on such
evidence in the formulation of their opinions, and the evidence’s probative value
substantially outweighs the risk of prejudicing the jury.118 In short, all five rules
provide barriers that evidence needs to overcome for future dangerousness evidence
to be admissible. The rest of Part III will demonstrate how FRE 401, 402, 403, 702,
and 703 can be applied to keep future dangerousness testimony from being consid-
ered by a factfinder, using Hare’s PCL-R as a case example.
A. Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist-Revised
“Psychopathy is a clinical construct” defined by a cluster of “interpersonal, af-
fective, and lifestyle characteristics.”119 Distinguishing characteristics of psychopathy
include: arrogance, callousness, dominance orientation, superficiality, manipulative-
ness, grandiosity, being quick to anger, inability to form strong emotional bonds
with others, an absence of feelings of guilt or anxiety, irresponsibility, ignoring/
violating social mores and conventions, and impulsive behavior.120 Psychopathy is
strongly correlated with criminal and antisocial behavior, and though psychopaths
117 FED. R. EVID. 702. The full text for the rule is:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.
Id.
118 FED. R. EVID. 703. The full text for the rule is:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in
forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the
opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inad-
missible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only
if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substan-
tially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Id. Future dangerousness testimony is almost always based on hearsay, as it is based on verbal
statements by the defendant or written records that are offered for the truth of the matter as-
serted, namely that the data and facts considered indicate that an individual will be dangerous
in the future. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
119 Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy as a Risk Factor for Violence, 70 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 181,
183 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
120 Id.
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make up only about 1% of the general population, they are disproportionately rep-
resented in the criminal justice system.121 Psychopathy is also closely associated
with both general and violent recidivism,122 with approximately 77% of psychopaths
recidivating violently, compared to about 21% of non-psychopaths.123 For these
reasons, courts often look to psychopathy as a risk factor for general and violent
recidivism among offenders.124
Hare’s PCL-R is a twenty-item measure designed to assess psychopathic person-
ality characteristics in correctional and forensic psychiatric populations.125 It is ad-
ministered in semistructured interview format and includes a review of collateral
records.126 The PCL-R items load on two factors, one representing the “interpersonal
or affective features (Factor 1) of psychopathy” and the other “the behavioral fea-
tures (Factor 2) of psychopathy.”127 Items are scored on a “0–2” scale, with “0”
indicating that the item does not apply to the person, “1” indicating that the item
may apply to the person, and “2” indicating that the item does apply to the person.128
121 Id. at 186.
122 James F. Hemphill et al., Psychopathy and Recidivism: A Review, 3 LEGAL & CRIMI-
NOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 139, 148–49 (1998). Research indicates that individuals high in psychop-
athy are three times more likely to recidivate generally than individuals low in psychopathy,
and between three and five times more likely to recidivate violently. Id. at 148–51.
123 Grant T. Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
625, 632 (1991).
124 Hare, supra note 119, at 187.
125 David DeMatteo & John F. Edens, The Role and Relevance of the Psychopathy
Checklist—Revised in Court: A Case Law Survey of U.S. Courts (1991–2004), 12 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 214, 216 (2006).
126 Id. Semistructed interviews are commonly used in qualitative research and are inter-
views which have a “flexible and fluid structure,” in contrast with structured interviews which
“contain a structured sequence of questions to be asked in the same way of all interviewees.”
Jennifer Mason, Semistructured Interview, in 3 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH METHODS 1020, 1020 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al. eds., 2004). Semistructured
interviews are organized around topics or themes, and are designed to be flexible so as to allow
the interview to be “shaped by the interviewee’s own understandings as well as the researcher’s
interests” and so that “unexpected themes can emerge.” Id. Collateral records are often used
to determine the veracity of interview content as well as to supplement it. See Karen C.
Kalmbach & Phillip M. Lyons, Ethical Issues in Conducting Forensic Evaluations, 2 APPLIED
PSYCHOL. CRIM. JUST. 261, 261, 266, 281 (2006). Collateral records may include “police or
criminal history reports, institutional records, personal correspondence, victim statements, medi-
cal records . . . employment records,” etc. Id. at 281.
127 DeMatteo & Edens, supra note 125. Examples of Factor 1 traits include “superficial
charm and callousness,” and examples of Factor 2 traits include “irresponsibility and poor
behavioral control.” Id. (citations omitted). The current version of the PCL-R also splits
Factor 1 and Factor 2 into four subfactors: interpersonal and affective for Factor 1 and impul-
sive lifestyle and antisocial behavior for Factor 2. Id.
128 KENT A. KIEHL, THE PSYCHOPATH WHISPERER: THE SCIENCE OF THOSE WITHOUT
CONSCIENCE 51 (2014). Scores of “1” and “2” are distinguished by the pervasiveness of the
characteristic across an individual’s life domains. Individuals who show the characteristic
2017] REDUCING THE DANGERS OF FUTURE TESTIMONY 1065
This scoring system yields a potential total score of forty, with scores of thirty and
above indicative that a person is a psychopath.129 However, while scores of thirty
have traditionally been used as the cutoff point for designating an individual as a
“psychopath,” research suggests that psychopathy is perhaps best viewed as being
along a continuum as opposed to as a discrete taxon.130
Research has established the PCL-R to be a strong predictor of violence, with
some researchers going as far as to characterize its predictive ability as “unparal-
leled” and “unprecedented,”131 and to refer to it as “the gold standard in the assess-
ment of psychopathy among incarcerated offenders.”132 The PCL-R has long been
used to assist in determining future violence risk as an aggravating factor in capital
sentencing,133 and its use for such a purpose has increased in recent years.134 This is
alarming given that the research regarding PCL-R performance at distinguishing
between psychopathic and non-psychopathic inmates in terms of institutional violence
is mixed. Although no established metric exists to determine the probative value and
in only some life domains are scored as “1,” while individuals who exhibit the trait in all or
nearly all aspects of life are scored as “2.” Id. For items for which not enough information
is present to make a valid judgment, these items can be omitted and the final score prorated.
Id. at 69. For examples of how the PCL-R might be scored, see generally id. at 52–77 (scoring
the PCL-R for two notable presidential assassins, John Wilkes-Booth and Charles Guiteau,
categorizing the latter as a psychopath based on a prorated score of 37.5, and not the former
based on his prorated score of 8.4, despite both committing the same offense).
129 DeMatteo & Edens, supra note 125, at 216.
130 See generally John F. Edens et al., Psychopathic, Not Psychopath: Taxometric Evidence
for the Dimensional Structure of Psychopathy, 115 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 131 (2006);
Jean-Pierre Guay et al., A Taxometric Analysis of the Latent Structure of Psychopathy:
Evidence for Dimensionality, 116 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 701 (2007); Glenn D. Walters et al.,
The Latent Structure of Psychopathy: A Taxometric Investigation of the Psychopathy Checklist—
Revised in a Heterogeneous Sample of Male Prison Inmates, 14 ASSESSMENT 270 (2007).
131 Hare, supra note 119, at 187 (quoting Randall T. Salekin et al., A Review and Meta-
Analysis of the Psychopathy Checklist and Psychopathy Checklist—Revised: Predictive
Validity of Dangerousness, 3 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 203, 211 (1996)).
132 Dennis E. Reidy et al., Psychopathy and Aggression: Examining the Role of Psychop-
athy Factors in Predicting Laboratory Aggression Under Hostile and Instrumental Conditions,
41 J. RES. PERSONALITY 1244, 1245 (2007).
133 Tiffany Walsh & Zach Walsh, The Evidentiary Introduction of Psychopathy Checklist—
Revised Assessed Psychopathy in U.S. Courts: Extent and Appropriateness, 30 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 493, 498–99 (2006).
134 David DeMatteo et al., Investigating the Role of the Psychopathy Checklist—Revised
in United States Case Law, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 96, 97–98, 100 (2014). From 1991
to 2004, only four cases reported use of the PCL-R in capital sentencing; from 2005–2012,
that number increased to eleven. DeMatteo & Edens, supra note 125, at 219; DeMatteo et
al., supra, at 99–100. As these case law reviews included only cases reported in the LexisNexis
electronic legal database, which mainly contains appellate cases, these numbers are an under-
estimate of the number of capital cases that use the PCL-R in sentencing. See DeMatteo &
Edens, supra note 125, at 216; DeMatteo et al., supra, at 97, 99, 104–05.
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prejudicial impact of PCL-R-based future dangerousness testimony, research regarding
the predictive ability of the PCL-R for institutional misconduct, and regarding the
labeling effects on juries when a defendant is labeled as a psychopath can help to
quantify the probative value and prejudicial impact of the PCL-R in capital sentenc-
ing. The following two sections will evaluate the probative value and prejudicial
impact of the PCL-R in capital contexts.
B. Probative Value: Predictive Ability of the PCL-R in Capital Sentencing Contexts
Regarding future dangerousness, due to the extremely low likelihood that an
individual sentenced to life in prison will ever reenter the community, the primary
outcome of interest in capital contexts is a capital offender’s risk of violence behind
prison walls.135 Several meta-analyses have explored the predictive ability of the
PCL-R regarding institutional violence.136 A 2003 meta-analysis by Glenn Walters
explored the predictive ability of PCL/PCL-R factor scores in predicting institu-
tional infractions, finding that Factor 1 was a weak but significant predictor of insti-
tutional violence while Factor 2 was a weak-to-moderate (and significant) predictor;
however, both factors were stronger predictors of institutional misconduct as a
whole as opposed to institutional violence specifically.137
Laura Guy and colleagues found in a 2005 meta-analysis that PCL-R total scores
were a weak and nonsignificant138 predictor of physical violence in prison, a moderate
but nonsignificant predictor of verbal and destructive (towards property) aggression,
and a moderate and significant predictor of general aggression.139 The Factor 1 score
was found to be a weak and nonsignificant predictor of both physical violence and
135 John F. Edens et al., No Sympathy for the Devil: Attributing Psychopathic Traits to
Capital Murderers Also Predicts Support for Executing Them, 4 PERSONALITY DISORDERS
175, 176 (2013) (citing Mark D. Cunningham, Dangerousness and Death: A Nexus in Search
of Science and Reason, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 828 (2006)).
136 Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines a meta-analysis as “a quantitative
statistical analysis of several separate but similar experiments or studies in order to test the
pooled data for statistical significance.” Meta-Analysis, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meta-analysis [https://perma.cc/A627-C37W].
137 Glenn D. Walters, Predicting Institutional Adjustment and Recidivism with the Psychop-
athy Checklist Factor Scores: A Meta-Analysis, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 541, 545–50 (2003).
138 Statistical significance for correlational studies indicates a certain level of confidence
(for psychology, usually ninety-five percent confidence) that the existence of a relationship be-
tween variables is not due to chance. See Interpretation of Correlation, STAT. CONCEPTS &
ANALYTICS EXPLAINED (Apr. 2010), http://statisticalconcepts.blogspot.com/2010/04/interpreta
tion-of-correlation.html [https://perma.cc/Y6DK-M7JZ]; see also Laura S. Guy et al., Does
Psychology Predict Institutional Misconduct Among Adults? A Meta-Analytic Investigation,
73 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1056, 1058–61 (2005).
139 Guy et al., supra note 138, at 1059–61. General aggression was “broadly defined” and
encompassed a host of different aggressive actions, “from obscene gestures to assaults re-
sulting in injury.” Id. at 1058.
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general aggression, but a weak-to-moderate (though nonsignificant) predictor of
verbal/destructive aggression.140 The Factor 2 score was found to be a nonsignificant
predictor for all three types of aggression, serving as a weak predictor of physical vio-
lence, a weak-to-moderate predictor of general aggression, and a weak-to-moderate
predictor of verbal/destructive aggression.141 Additionally, though PCL-R total and
factor scores were somewhat useful predictors of institutional aggression, they tended
to be better predictors of overall institutional misconduct (containing aggressive and
nonaggressive misconduct) than institutional aggression by itself.142
A 2008 meta-analysis by Anne-Marie Leistico and colleagues yielded stronger
findings than the Guy study.143 Results suggested that PCL-R total and factor scores
generated moderate to large effect sizes144 regarding general institutional infractions,
as well as nonviolent versus violent institutional misconduct.145
C. Prejudicial Impact: Labeling and Its Impact on Mock Jurors
A handful of studies have explored the impact on the jury of either designating
defendants as a psychopath or attributing psychopathic traits to them. In a 2004
study, Edens and colleagues presented a sample of undergraduate students with a
case summary of a homicide offense and a summary of an expert’s testimony from
the case.146 The researchers manipulated the expert’s testimony such that the expert
diagnosed the defendant with psychopathy, psychosis, or nothing, as well as the
defendant’s risk for future violence (either low or high).147 Results indicated that
defendants given a diagnosis were judged to be more dangerous than defendants
with no diagnosis; additionally, results suggested that participants’ perceptions of
dangerousness stemmed mainly from the diagnostic label given to the defendant, not
from the information provided on likelihood of future dangerousness.148
Edens and colleagues conducted a subsequent study in 2005, repeating the same
procedure from the previous study but this time providing clear instructions to the
140 Id. at 1059–61.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See generally Anne-Marie R. Leistico et al., A Large-Scale Meta-Analysis Relating the
Hare Measures of Psychopathy to Antisocial Conduct, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 28 (2008).
144 Effect size indicates the magnitude or strength of the relationship between variables,
with larger effect size values indicating a greater magnitude of the relationship. See KELLY
MATHESON, STATISTICAL VERSUS PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 1–4 (2008). It is often used to
distinguish between statistical and practical significance (whether a relationship is large enough
in magnitude to be of value). See id.
145 See Leistico et al., supra note 143, at 33.
146 John F. Edens et al., Effects of Psychopathy and Violence Risk Testimony on Mock
Juror Perceptions of Dangerousness in a Capital Murder Trial, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L.
393, 397–98 (2004).
147 Id. at 398.
148 Id. at 403.
1068 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1047
mock jurors that the defendant should be sentenced to death only in the event that no
mitigating factors were found and the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant’s risk of future dangerousness would make him a perpetual
threat to society.149 Results largely reflected those of the previous study; however, they
also indicated that mock jurors were significantly more likely to sentence a psycho-
pathic defendant to death as opposed to a psychotic defendant or a defendant with
no diagnosis.150
Next, Jennifer Cox and colleagues conducted a study in which they presented mock
jurors with four vignettes that described the trial phase of a capital case; the vignettes
varied according to whether the expert witness had labeled the defendant a psychopath
and whether the level of risk of future danger the defendant posed was high or low.151
They found no significant difference between vignettes with the defendant labeled a
psychopath versus not labeled a psychopath on death decisions or predictions of
future violence; however, there was a significant difference between the high and low
danger risk vignettes in terms of mock jurors’ perceptions of whether the defendant
would commit murder or another violent crime if not given the death penalty.152
Finally, Edens and colleagues conducted another study in which data were aggre-
gated from the two aforementioned studies in addition to an unpublished master’s
thesis, to investigate the ability of the subcomponents of psychopathy and individual
items on the PCL-R to predict mock jurors’ attitudes towards the death penalty.153
Results indicated a significant difference in mock jurors’ perceptions of the death
penalty when defendants had PCL-R total scores below twenty versus above twenty,
and when Factor 1 scores were below versus above eight, such that mock jurors were
more likely to support death for defendants in the higher score brackets.154 However,
when Factor 1 scores were held constant, the predictive ability of PCL-R total scores
was no longer significant, suggesting that support for the death penalty was driven
primarily by Factor 1 scores.155
D. Admissibility Under FRE 401, 402, 403, 702, and 703
As previously suggested, FRE 401, 402, 403, 702, and 703 can be viewed as
providing increasing levels of protection against specious evidence. FRE 401 and
402 prevents a jury from hearing irrelevant evidence, or evidence that is immaterial
149 John F. Edens et al., The Impact of Mental Health Evidence on Support for Capital
Punishment: Are Defendants Labeled Psychopathic Considered More Deserving of Death?,
23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 603, 609–13 (2005).
150 Id. at 613–18.
151 Jennifer Cox et al., The Effect of the Psychopathy Checklist—Revised in Capital Cases:
Mock Jurors’ Responses to the Label of Psychopathy, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 878, 882–84 (2010).
152 Id. at 884–85.
153 Edens et al., supra note 135, at 177–78.
154 Id. at 178.
155 Id. at 178–80.
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and fails to make a particular fact more or less likely.156 If evidence is deemed to be
relevant, FRE 403 may prevent a jury from hearing it if its risk of prejudicing the
jury against the defendant substantially outweighs the evidence’s probative value.157
FRE 702 prevents experts from testifying as to evidence that is not “based on suf-
ficient facts or data” or that is not “the product of reliable principles and methods.”158
Finally, FRE 703 prevents expert witnesses from disclosing the bases of their opinions
when that evidence would be otherwise inadmissible (such as hearsay, which scores
on risk assessment measure qualify as), unless the probative value of that evidence
substantially outweighs any risk it presents of prejudicing the jury.159
Concerning FRE 401 and 402, PCL-R-based future dangerousness evidence
should be deemed inadmissible if PCL-R scores are immaterial to institutional vio-
lence or if PCL-R scores fail to predict institutional violence.160 The extant literature
indicates that the ability of the PCL-R to reliably predict institutional violence is
nonexistent at worst and quite poor at best.161 The accumulated weight of the evi-
dence leaves the PCL-R’s ability to predict institutional violence unclear, indicating
that the probative value of the PCL-R in determining future dangerousness for capital
offenders is slight, if indeed it is probative at all. As such, FRE 401and 402 chal-
lenges to the PCL-R in determinations of future dangerousness for capital offenders
may be warranted. Indeed, such challenges would not be unprecedented; a survey of
PCL-R use in United States courts revealed some precedent for the PCL-R success-
fully being challenged on the basis of relevance.162
Considering FRE 403, PCL-R-based future dangerousness evidence should be
deemed inadmissible if the prejudice that labeling an individual a “psychopath” causes
the jury substantially outweighs the PCL-R’s probative value in determining future
dangerousness via institutional violence.163 As indicated above and in Section III.B, the
probative value of the PCL-R in determining future dangerousness via institutional
violence is minimal, if probative value exists at all.164 However, the weight of the evi-
dence suggests that there is a psychopathy labeling effect in capital contexts, such
that individuals labeled as “psychopaths” are perceived to be at a greater risk of
future dangerousness by mock jurors and are significantly more likely to receive a
death sentence than capital offenders who are not labeled as “psychopaths.”165 As such,
PCL-R evidence presented for the purpose of demonstrating future dangerousness in
156 FED. R. EVID. 401–402.
157 FED. R. EVID. 403.
158 FED. R. EVID. 702.
159 FED. R. EVID. 703.
160 See FED. R. EVID. 401–402.
161 See supra Section III.B.
162 See DeMatteo & Edens, supra note 125, at 219; DeMatteo et al., supra note 134, at
100, 104.
163 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
164 See supra Section III.B.
165 See supra Section III.C.
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capital contexts is ripe for a FRE 403 challenge. Again, such a challenge would not be
unprecedented; a survey of PCL-R use in United States courts indicates that the PCL-
R has been successfully challenged on FRE 403 grounds in some jurisdictions.166
Relating to FRE 702, an expert witness should not be allowed to testify as to
PCL-R-based future dangerousness evidence if such evidence is not “based on suf-
ficient facts or data” or is not “the product of reliable principles and methods.”167
Due to the PCL-R’s nonexistent or weak ability to predict institutional violence,168
it is arguable that an opinion of future dangerousness in capital contexts based largely
on PCL-R score and psychopathy label is not “based on sufficient facts or data.”169
Additionally, it is quite likely that PCL-R-based future dangerousness evidence
is not “the product of reliable principles and methods.”170 First, the weight of the evi-
dence demonstrates that the ability of the PCL-R to predict institutional violence is
suspect.171 Second, in light of recent evidence suggesting an impact of adversarial
allegiance on PCL-R score, the use of the PCL-R in United States courts is debatable
to begin with.172 In recent years, leading experts in the field of forensic psychology
have questioned the use of the PCL-R in forensic contexts due to its poor interrater
reliability;173 the accumulated research strongly suggests that the adversarial allegiance
of an evaluator impacts an evaluee’s score on the PCL-R.174 Evaluations by evaluators
hired by the prosecution tend to produce higher PCL-R scores; in contrast, evaluations
by evaluators hired by the defense tend to produce lower PCL-R scores.175
Third, best ethical practices in psychology and forensic psychology specifically
indicate that psychologists should not utilize measures “whose validity and reliability
166 DeMatteo & Edens, supra note 125, at 219; DeMatteo et al., supra note 134, at 104.
167 FED. R. EVID. 702.
168 See supra Section III.B.
169 See FED. R. EVID. 702.
170 See id.
171 See supra Section III.B.
172 See generally Daniel C. Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Biased by the Side that Re-
tained Them?, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1889 (2013) [hereinafter Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts
Biased] (finding that when rating the same offenders, evaluators who believed they were hired
by the prosecution assigned higher PCL-R scores to the offender than did evaluators who be-
lieved they were hired by the defense); Daniel C. Murrie et al., Does Interrater (Dis)agreement
on Psychopathy Checklist Scores in Sexually Violent Predator Trials Suggest Partisan Alle-
giance in Forensic Evaluations?, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 352 (2008) [hereinafter Murrie
et al., Interrater (Dis)agreement] (finding that when evaluators scored the PCL-R in sex offender
civil commitment contexts, score differences varied more than the PCL-R’s measurement error
would suggest and tended to be in the direction of the evaluator’s adversarial allegiance).
173 See Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Biased, supra note 172, at 1896; Murrie et al.,
Interrater (Dis)agreement, supra note 172, at 358.
174 Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Biased, supra note 172, at 1893–95; Murrie et al.,
Interrater (Dis)agreement, supra note 172, at 358–59.
175 See Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Biased, supra note 172, at 1893; Murrie et al.,
Interrater (Dis)agreement, supra note 172, at 355–56.
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have [not] been established for use with members of the population tested.”176 Although
the PCL-R’s validity and reliability have been demonstrated in terms of community
members and offenders more generally, its validity and reliability have not been
established with capital offender populations specifically.177 In light of the PCL-R’s
relative inability to predict institutional violence, the impact of adversarial allegiance
on PCL-R score, and the fact that the PCL-R’s reliability has not been demonstrated in
capital populations, the presentation of PCL-R-based future dangerousness evidence
is likely not “the product of reliable principles and methods.”178 Therefore, PCL-R-
based future dangerousness is ripe for a challenge on FRE 702 grounds.
Lastly, regarding FRE 703, experts should not be allowed to use PCL-R scores
and the “psychopathy” label as the basis for their opinion that an individual is a
future danger unless the probative value of the PCL-R in predicting institutional
violence “substantially outweighs” the prejudicial impact that a “psychopathy” label
can have on a jury.179 This can be viewed as a reverse FRE 403 analysis. It has been
previously established that the ability of the PCL-R to predict institutional violence
is suspect at best, rendering its probative value questionable.180 In contrast, the
existence of a psychopathy labeling effect in capital contexts is well-established.181
Therefore, it is exceedingly unlikely that the PCL-R and a psychopathy label could be
viewed as being substantially more probative than prejudicial, making PCL-R-based
future dangerousness evidence ripe for a challenge on FRE 703 grounds.182 Under
FRE 703, experts should be allowed to render an opinion as to whether a capital
offender will be a future danger behind prison walls; however, that expert should not
176 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF
CONDUCT 12 (2010), http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8QM
-922J] [hereinafter EPPCC]. The term “reliability” refers to the ability of an instrument to
produce “the same results each time it is used in the same setting with the same type of sub-
jects.” Gail M. Sullivan, Editorial, A Primer on the Validity of Assessment Instruments, 3 J.
GRADUATE MED. EDUC. 119, 119 (2011). The term “validity” refers to “how well [an] assess-
ment tool actually measures the underlying outcome of interest.” Id. Two ethical codes govern
the conduct of forensic psychologists: the EPPCC and the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic
Psychology (SGFP). EPPCC, supra; Am. Psychological Ass’n, Specialty Guidelines for
Forensic Psychology, 68 AM. PSYCHOL. 7 (2013) [hereinafter SGFP]. Standard 9.02(b) of
the EPPCC instructs that “[p]sychologists use assessment instruments whose validity and
reliability have been established for use with members of the population tested. When such
validity or reliability has not been established, psychologists describe the strengths and limi-
tations of test results and interpretation.” EPPCC, supra, at 12. Standard 10.02 of the SGFP
instructs that “[f ]orensic practitioners use assessment instruments whose validity and reli-
ability have been established for use with members of the population assessed.” SGFP,
supra, at 15.
177 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 90, at 67; Edens et al., supra note 89, at 67.
178 FED. R. EVID. 702.
179 FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
180 See supra Section III.B.
181 See supra Section III.C.
182 See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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be allowed to reveal to a jury that his/her opinion is based on perceiving the offender
to be a psychopath.
CONCLUSION
The United States has long held that the death penalty cannot be issued arbitrarily,
and it has generated a number of holdings regarding capital sentencing procedures
designed to give at least minimal protections to capital offenders who do not fit into
classes of individuals excluded from the death penalty.183 As a response to these hold-
ings, states have sought to provide juries with objective criteria to assist them in making
death sentence decisions by outlining the sentencing phase of capital trials, providing
nonexhaustive lists of mitigating factors, and providing statutory aggravating factors
of which one or more is required to be found to impose the death penalty.184 One such
aggravating factor that states ask juries to consider is a defendant’s future dangerous-
ness, or the likelihood that he or she will engage in violent institutional misconduct.185
Future dangerousness may be proven via expert testimony from psychologists
or psychiatrists; unfortunately, however, the current state of the psychological and
psychiatric research does not support an ability to accurately predict institutional
violence among death row offenders.186 As such, its consideration by the jury poses
penological issues because evidentiary rules typically do not apply during sentenc-
ing.187 One potential solution to keep unreliable future dangerousness testimony out
of capital sentencing is to apply the FRE, particularly FRE 401, 402, 403, 702, and
703, to the sentencing phase of capital trials.188 This solution was demonstrated through
application of a case example in the form of the PCL-R, a measure commonly relied
upon to inform future dangerousness testimony.189 Given the mixed empirical evidence
regarding the predictive validity and labeling effects of the PCL-R in capital contexts,
there is a chance that PCL-R-based future dangerousness testimony would be barred
under FRE 401, 402, and 403, and it is likely that it would be barred under FRE 702
and 703.190 Given this case example, applying the FRE to capital sentencing may be
a promising solution to diminishing the impact that specious future dangerousness
testimony may have on jurors.
183 See supra Part I.
184 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 63 and accompanying text; Part II.
186 See supra Section II.B.
187 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
188 See supra Part III.
189 See supra Section III.A.
190 See supra Section III.D.
